The Rush to German Unity by Konrad H. Jarausch

Author:Konrad H. Jarausch
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Publisher: Oxford University Press

Diplomatic Destabilization

Economic collapse and political disarray raised doubts about the continued viability of the East German state. During Vaclav Havel's visit and talks with Western business leaders, Modrow still stressed GDR sovereignty. But the COMECON meeting on January 9 revealed "so many illusions" that the prime minister concluded: "Only an orientation to West Germany was a realistic alternative for us." But this was more easily said than done. In East Berlin the PDS and the Round Table distrusted reliance on Western help. Moreover, in Bonn the FDP and SPD warned against dealing with the SED and pouring money into a bankrupt regime.52

Mounting GDR difficulties spurred Helmut Kohl to work on improving the international prospects for unification. During intensive discussions with President Mitterrand, the chancellor dispelled French fears by reiterating his commitment to European integration. In response to the Soviet food shortage, the West German government began sending supplies in order to shore up Gorbachev and soften Russian opposition. Though feminists deprecated "the dreams of old men," the Western parties began to increase contacts with potential Eastern partners in order to prepare for the coming election campaign. East German troubles renewed the momentum toward unity in the first weeks of the new year.53

The Eastern turmoil also rendered plans for a treaty community obsolete. When Modrow suggested a visit in February to discuss the project, Bonn responded favorably. To the television public Kohl explained the need for "giving the people a perspective" while he reassured the international community that he had no fixed timetable for unity. But on January 15 the dramatic news of the storming of the Stasi citadel changed his mind. When he realized the depth of East German discontent, the chancellor wanted "to push the SED-PDS out of the government as quickly as possible" and postpone serious talks until after free elections. Unfortunately, Bonn never communicated this shift to East Berlin.54

The GDR government presented a draft on "cooperation and good neighborliness" on January 17. As a "new dimension of mutual relations," a treaty community that "opens the way to a confederation" should contain a "consultative commission" and create "an economic association" with a currency link. Since Kohl had privately decided that "concluding treaties with Modrow no longer makes any sense," he decided to put off actual negotiations until after a democratic government was formed. Bonn was willing to encourage reforms and discuss short-term help only in order to stem the refugee tide. When the East Germans pressed for "a fast start to negotiations" and for massive financial help, Minister Seiters turned a deaf ear.55

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